772
(Confidential.)
14
British prestige locally suffers to a certain extent from our alliance with Japan, and to a greater extent from a campaign of hostile insinuation carried on against us by American missionary and educational circles in South China, who are extremely friendly with the Kuomin Tang leaders.
I have, &c.
15
they do not win respect. China is on the way to a front place in the family of nations. Her people will not rest satisfied with the institutions of antiquity. It is as futile to oppose China's progress by external hindrances, as it would be to oppose an earthquake with arguments. If Great Britain wishes to maintain her influence in China the British policy must conform to the spirit of progress and the aspirations of an awakened people.
J. W. JAMIESON.
Enclosure 12 in No. 1.
Extract from the "Canton Times" of 22nd February.
British Influence in Kwangtung.
FROM the time China ceded the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain in 1842 Britishers were destined to play an increasingly important part in the trade and internal development of the Kwangtung province. Controlling, as they do, the only available seaport through which must pass all the imports and exports of this province, the Government at Hong Kong is in a position to facilitate or strangle the commerce and trade of Kwangtung. In a word, Canton is commercially at the mercy of Hong Kong.
That the Hong Kong, or rather the British, authorities are aware of their advantage has been frequently demonstrated. Whenever a controversy arises between the Government at Canton and foreign Powers there is always a veiled threat given circulation to the effect that Hong Kong will cut off all communication and isolate Canton from the rest of the world. This is the big stick" which is constantly held over the heads of the Cantonese.
Now there is no reason why the Governments at Canton and Hong Kong cannot co-operate for their mutual benefit. Kwangtung must have foreign capital for the development of her mines, construction of her railways, and promotion of her industries. There is every reason for the Cantonese to give the British the first chance in all these projects. All other things being equal, it is only natural that the Cantonese should turn to their neighbour for assistance when they have so much in common.
But the British are not popular with the Cantonese or with the Chinese in general. This is a fact which is dawning upon those Britishers who are really the beat friends of China. This growing antipathy is not due to acts of aggression or unfairness on the part of the British merchants. It is entirely due to the incom- prehensible stupidity of British policy in the Far East. Contining ourselves to China, a study of the history of the past few years reveals Great Britain always on the side of the reactionary forces in China. Great Britain backed Yuan Shih-kai and Tuan Chi-jui. Great Britain backed Lung Chi-kwong and Lu Yung-ting. Great Britain, with the other Powers that follow her lead, is now prolonging the agony in Peking where Hsu Shih-chang is burlesquing the part of a chief executive. What is the motive behind this? What does Great Britain expect to gain by such a policy?
Some people surmise that Great Britain does not want China to have a republic because it would affect British control in India, for then the Indians would become impregnated with democratic ideals and clamour for a republic too. But India seems to be well on the road toward self-government despite the policy of Great Britain in China. So that cannot be the reason.
Whatever the reason may be, one thing is clear the British have put every obstacle in the way of progressive movements in China. They have supported reactionaries and conservatives, while they have opposed liberal and progressive leaders. They have insensibly forfeited their leadership and nullified the influence Great Britain might have had in the shaping of China's future.
Those
When the Cantonese came back last October the Government made friendly overtures to Hong Kong and expressed an earnest desire for the fullest and most open co-operation. This elicited no response from the Hong Kong Government. who advocated closer relations between the progressive leaders and Great Britain suffered a bitter humiliation.
Great Britain must change her policy or she will lose her influence in China. Gunboat diplomacy, threats and intimidations may serve to bolster up prestige, but
(No. 60.) Sir,
Enclosure 13 in No. 1.
Consul-General Jamieson to Sir B. Alston.
Canton, July 25, 1921, HAVING reference to my telegram No, 35, Confidential, of the 14th June, on the subject of the Kwangtung collieries, I have now the honour to enclose copy of a confidential letter addressed to me by Major Cassel and of my reply thereto.
I am almost certain, although unable to substantiate the statement, that the "accredited agents 3
to whom he refers were a delegation from the local Bureau of Foreign Affairs, which wanted me to give them an introduction to the Colonial Secretary, with a view to pointing out to that functionary in person how seriously the comforting of Yang Yung-t'ai was likely to prejudice the interests of the colony. I replied that I would have an objection to his interviewing Mr. Severn, so member of my own staff was present at the interview, and the matter then dropped.
long as a The refusal of Sun Yat-sen's Government, greatly strengthened by the fall of Kwangshi, to recognise the recently signed Sino-German agreement is indicative of their determination to exercise independent rule, and it is only with the Provincial Government that negotiations can henceforward be carried on with any hope of success.
I have, &c.
J. W. JAMIESON.
(Confidential.)
Enclosure 14 in No. 1.
Major Cassel to Consul-General Jamieson.
My dear Jamieson,
MANY thanks for your letter, dated the 14th June, and for information contained
Hong Kong, July 23, 1921. therein.
It seems a long time not to have answered, but there are now so many cooks in this broth that it takes quite a time to get round; that, however, has not been the sole reason for not having taken action on your letter, the chief reason being that owing to the fighting we thought the moment inopportune for negotiations, and thought it wise to lay low and see which way the cat was going to jump so fur the cat appears to have jumped the wrong way, as far as we are concerned.
There are two things which I must tell you about, both in the strictest confidence, firstly, I understand from an unquestionable source that duly accredited agents came down to Hong Kong and had a very lengthy interview with Walker, of the Standard Oil, to whom they suggested giving a concession for working the coal in Kwangtung. Walker after several hours' conversation pointed out that the Chinese had always had a square deal from the British, and as far as America and American interests were concerned it was quite obvious to him that Kwangtung must be opened up by British capital and no other, consequently advising them that the people to whom the coal concession had already been granted were people of very high reputation and almost unlimited capital, and that he was quite sure the Chinese would get a square deal
from them.
The delegates left expressing the opinion that Walker was right, and firmly convinced that their best chance of opening up the Kwangtung coalfields lay in recognising our agreement, even though in a modified form. This I think you will agree may have far-reaching consequences in our favour,
Secondly, I have heard through Chinese sources that instructions have been issued to the magistrates of the province of Kwangtung by the powers that be to prevent any of our engineers from examining reputed coalfields,
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